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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cannot rebut this presumption by a showing of his violation of
the registration statute.5 0
In Switzer v. Aldrich,51 the Court of Appeals was once again
confronted with a situation of this type. In a suit by the widow
of a person killed by the negligent operation of a truck, the dealer
who had sold the truck was made a defendant on the ground of
his owner~ship of the vehicle. The trial court admitted evidence
showing that the dealer was not the owner, but had sold the
truck to the person who was driving it at the time of the accident.
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the action of the
trial judge, distinguishing Reese v. Reamore, 2 on the ground
that in that case the dealer had allowed the use of his license
plates over an extended period of time with the knowledge that
the operator had no intention of applying promptly for a license.
In the instant case there was an interval of only four days between the sale and the accident. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Appellate Division and applied the doctrine
of the Reese case strictly, holding that any deliberate violation
of the statutory requirements is sufficient ground for an estoppel.
IV.

CONTRACTS

Parol Evidence Ride
In Perlman v. Israel & Sons Co.,' it appeared that an oral
contract of the sale was made and confirmatory letters were
exchanged which evidenced the contract. When the buyers sued
for breach of contract, defendants alleged a valid tender. The
Trial Judge excluded testimony of the defendant which offered
to show the conversation at the time the agreement was consummated, and charged the jury that plaintiffs were not bound to
accept goods allegedly tendered, so long as they were willing to
take and pay for them before the contract term expired. The
Court of Appeals, reversing a judgment for plaintiff held, that
the exclusion of evidence was erroneous and a tender, if made
and refused, resulted in a breach of contract excusing defendant
from further performance.
The parol evidence rule applies only where the parties to an
agreement reduce it to writing and intend that that writing shall
50. Shuba v. Greendonner, 271 N. Y. 189, 2 N. E. 2d 536 (1936).
51. Switzer v. Aldrich, 307 N. Y. 56, 120 N. E. 2d 159 (1954).
52. Supra note 48.
1. 306 N. Y. 254, 117 N. E. 2d 352 (1954).
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be their agreement.2 The writing need not be of a formal character; letters and telegrams are sufficient if the requisite intent
is found.3 Since the court stated the letters evidenced a contract,
the rule that any relevant testimony may be admitted to prove
that the document was not adopted as an integration, does not
apply. Evidence showing that no assent was made to a complete
and accurate integration is still permitted under such circumstances,5 and in fact the letters exchanged between the parties
in the instant case contained some variance. Some parol evidence
may have been appropriate to show the surrounding circumstances
out of which the agreement arose,6 if this would help clarify the
meaning of the language used by the parties.
The court reinforced the rule that a seller is not restricted to
tender the goods on any particular day, but may offer delivery at
any time during the contract term," so long as the seller does not
offer the goods at an unreasonable hour' or under circumstances
which may put the buyer in technical default." Nor does the
buyer's later willingness to accept delivery aid him, since' the
breach of contract excuses the seller from further performance on
his part.10
Agreements to Arbitrate
a. In sales memorandum: Since arbitration is -an inexpensive, expeditious method of adjusting controversies, it is the policy
of the courts to encourage and uphold arbitration. 1 However,
the intent to arbitrate must be clearly shown. 1 2 For the second
time in two years, the court was presented with the vexing problem of whether such an intention was sufficiently evidenced by the
signing of an agreement which referred to rules of a trade association including among them a mandatory arbitration clause. The
2. Fricdman & Co. v. Newman, 255 IN.Y. 340, 174 N. E. 703 (1931) ; Chapin v.
Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74 (1879); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 633, (Riv. ed. 1936).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §228, Comment (a). Ilus. 2; 3 CoRmI, op. cit.,
§588 (1951).
4. 3 CoRBN, op. cit., §577.
5. Id. § 582. See Hale. The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 OR. L. REv. 91 (1925).
6. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs, 235 N. Y. 30, 138 N. E. 495 (1923);
3 CogarN, op. cit., § 579.
7. Curtiss v. Howell, 39 N. Y. 211' (1868); Bahnsen & Co. v. Leaf, 203
App. Div. 618, 197 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1st Dep't 1922); 2 WILLISrOr, SALES,
§ 451 (1948).
8. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 124 (4).
9. Manners & Co. v. Hershenhorn & Sons, 280 App. Div. 711, 116 N. Y. S. 2d
532 (1st Dep't 1952).
10. Jardine, Matheson & Co. v. Huguet Silk Co.. 203 N. Y. 273, 96 N. E. 449
(1911) ; Gourd v. Healy, 206 N. Y. 423, 99 N. E. 1099 (1912).
11. Feuer Transportation,Inc. v. Local Union No. 445, 295 N. Y. 87, 65 N. E. 2d
178 (1946).
12. Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N. Y. 130, 190 N. E. 208 (1934).

